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This paper aims to explore possible avenues for
the future development of the European
eSignatures Directive, and more generally of a
common European legal framework for trust
services. It builds on the observation that the
eSignature Directive has largely been unable to
support an internal market for certification service
providers, i.e. entities that issue signature
certificates or provide other services related to
electronic signatures.1 Part of the problem lies
undoubtedly in non-legal factors, including the
still uncertain business case for certification
service providers: is there sufficient market
interest for citizens and businesses in spending
money on digital signatures, or do simpler, more
flexible and cheaper e-signature solutions
suffice? However, it is also clear that the Directive
itself is too ambiguous on crucial points, and does
not consider the essential link between e-
signatures and ancillary services. The current
review of the Directive is an opportunity to remedy
these problems.2
Introduction
In recent years, e-signatures have enjoyed increasing
attention at the European policy level. As such, this is
not surprising: both in the private and public sector,
more and more sensitive transactions are conducted
electronically, increasing the need for mechanisms that
enable trust. E-signatures are a primary example of such
a tool, given their stated purpose of serving as a
method of authentication.3
Unfortunately, this increasing policy interest in e-
signatures is largely caused by a relatively gloomy
observation: advanced e-signatures (known as digital
signatures elsewhere) in the European Union and
elsewhere function largely in the context of closed
public key frameworks. As long as a signatory remains
within that specific context – e-banking applications,
national e-government services, professional document
management systems – the policy framework
established within that context provides clearly for any
problems. But as soon as he attempts to use a digital
signature outside of that policy framework, digital
signatures are virtually unused.4 This is a fairly
disappointing and sobering conclusion for a technology
that was entrusted with the seemingly simple task of
replacing the hand written signature. Hand written
signatures are at best a moderately reliable
authentication tool, whose value stems mainly from the
fact that people have been used to them for a long time,
rather than from any objective security characteristics.
And yet, modern technology has failed to come up with
a similarly simple, flexible and universally accepted
electronic equivalent.
To some extent, this observation is a matter of
By Hans Graux
1 As defined in Article 2.12 of Directive 1999/93/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, p. 12 (e-
Signatures Directive).
2 Supported by the ongoing study SMART 2010/008
‘Feasibility study on an electronic identification,
authentication and signature policy (IAS)’. The EU
have awarded the contract to DLA Piper, Brussels,
supported by subcontractors
PricewaterhouseCoopers, SEALED, Studio Notarile
Genghini and time.lex. The author a co-contributor
to this study.
3 As stated in Article 2.12 of the e-Signatures
Directive.
4 Dr Aashish Srivastava considered the problems of
electronic signatures for his PhD, and some of his
findings can be found at ‘Businesses’ perception
of electronic signatures: An Australian study’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review, 6 (2009) 46 – 56.
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perception and expectation. It is debatable whether it is
a problem if no open interoperable market develops for
complex e-signature services. The observation about
the current limitations of PKI based signature
technologies is mainly valid for e-signature technologies
that rely on strong identification and authentication of
the signatory. While these can offer substantial benefits
in terms of trustworthiness and security over simpler
technologies, it is not clear whether they are relevant in
respect of the realities of today’s digital market, where
trust seems to be based as much on subjective factors
such as reputation as on objective security
considerations. One might reasonably wonder if there is
such a significant business opportunity in higher quality
electronic signatures. If there was a genuine demand for
this type of interoperability, would not the market have
spontaneously gravitated towards it?
None the less, certain applications clearly have higher
objective security needs. The financial sector is a good
example, as are higher value transactions such as
electronic public procurement. In these cases, the lack
of interoperability between advanced signature
solutions is inefficient (how many smart cards can your
wallet realistically contain?) and encourages bad
security practices (how many of those cards currently
have the same PIN?). For these reasons alone,
interoperability would be desirable as a device to
stimulate confidence in the digital market, to avoid
needless costs, to enable high value trusted electronic
services, and to facilitate the uptake of such services by
everyday citizens.
Background and scope of the eSignature
Directive
Much of the issues covered in the introduction above
are also reflected in the e-signatures Directive, or more
formally, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures. This
Directive states its purpose in article 2: it aims “to
facilitate the use of electronic signatures and to
contribute to their legal recognition. It establishes a
legal framework for electronic signatures and certain
certification-services in order to ensure the proper
functioning of the internal market.”
The Directive aimed to ensure that legal uncertainties
surrounding the value of e-signatures would not
become a barrier to the budding e-signatures market in
the European Union, or perhaps more accurately, that
such uncertainties could reasonably be kept to a
minimum. The elimination of any kind of legal
uncertainty was (and remains) a practical impossibility,
due to the large variety of approaches to e-signatures
and their technical characteristics. The European law
maker had to tread a fine line between flexibility
(allowing different technologies with different degrees
of reliability) and legal certainty (ensuring the
predictability of the legal value of at least some types of
e-signature).
This resulted in the compromise that is now relatively
well known. Conceptually, the Directive creates three
tiers of e-signatures:
1. The basic e-signature concept, i.e. data in electronic
form which are attached to or logically associated
with other electronic data and which serve as a
method of authentication;
2. The advanced e-signature concept, i.e. an electronic
signature which:
(a) is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) is created using means that the signatory can
maintain under his sole control; and
(d) is linked to the data to which it relates in such a
manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable.
In practical terms, the advanced e-signature
concept currently implies the use of PKI technology,
and is therefore not entirely technologically neutral.
3. The advanced electronic signatures which are
based on a qualified certificate and which are
created by a secure-signature-creation device,
commonly referred to as qualified electronic
signatures. This is also the terminology that will be
used in this article.
When considering legal certainty however, the Directive
contains only two tiers:
1. All e-signatures benefit from a non-discrimination
rule (article 5.2), meaning broadly that their legal
effectiveness and admissibility as evidence in legal
proceedings cannot be denied merely on the
grounds of being electronic or of not complying with
one of the requirements for qualified signatures. Of
course, this does not eliminate the possibility of e-
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signatures being rejected for any number of other
reasons, including for instance the use of
insufficiently reliable technologies, taking into
account all circumstances which are relevant to the
case (e.g. the behaviour of the parties after an e-
signature has been created).
2. Only qualified signatures benefit from the
equivalence rule (article 5.1), meaning that these
signatures are automatically considered to satisfy
the legal requirements of a signature in the same
manner as a hand written signature, and that they
are always admissible as evidence in legal
proceedings.
In effect, the system of legal certainty in the Directive is
remarkably binary: qualified signatures are endowed
with legal certainty, and other types of e-signatures are
not. This situation can be affected substantially by
additional rules, such as by specific laws declaring other
forms of e-signature to also be equivalent to hand
written signatures, or more typically by contractual
arrangements in which the relevant parties make
separate arrangements on the legal validity and
admissibility of e-signatures in advance.
The conceptual framework in European e-signature
laws is thus very much centered around e-signatures as
a tool for emulating hand written signatures. While the
market access and internal market rules (articles 3 and
4 of the Directive) apply to all types of certification
service providers and certification services, the only
provision in the Directive that governs the legal effect of
these services is focused on achieving equivalence with
hand written signatures. This observation may appear to
be trivial, but it is not. From a technical perspective, the
cryptographic process of signing specific data can serve
many other functions which have little to no logical
connection to a hand written signature. As examples,
one might consider:
1. The identification of a person (entity authentication)
may use identical technologies, yet there is no
intention of achieving equivalence to a hand written
signature.
2.The use of electronic stamps or seals, where a
entity signs a document to authenticate it on behalf
of a legal person (e.g. a company seal or
administrative stamp), or even on behalf of an
computer system or process, in which hand written
signatures may be entirely inappropriate or even
nonsensical as an analogy.
3.Authorization management, where the user wants
to demonstrate a certain legal mandate (e.g. to
confirm the status of doctor, lawyer, notary public,
etc) or access/usage right (e.g. the status of
employee, citizenship, or simply of being an adult).
In these cases, equivalence to a hand written
signature may not necessarily be the desired goal.
4.Time stamping, where the equivalence to a hand
written signature is irrelevant, since the only
intention is to add a trustworthy time reference to a
specific transaction.
The Directive is only marginally relevant to all of 
these functions. This is not to say that it has no effect 
on them:
1. First, the e-signature itself is defined as “data in
electronic form which are attached to or logically
associated with other electronic data and which
serve as a method of authentication” (emphasis
added). This definition makes no explicit or implied
reference to the purpose of creating a substitute for
a hand written signature; indeed, based on this
terminology alone, all of the examples above could
be said to be covered by the definition of an
electronic signature, since they are all methods of
authentication (either entity authentication or data
authentication).5
2.Second, the notion of a “certification-service-
provider” is very broadly defined in the Directive as
“an entity or a legal or natural person who issues
certificates or provides other services related to
electronic signatures” (emphasis added). Again, the
definition is so broad that virtually all types of
authentication service providers could be said to be
covered.
None the less, even under this broad interpretation of
the Directive’s terminology, the Directive does not
provide a material legal framework for the services
mentioned above. Admittedly, the market access and
internal market provisions of the Directive (mainly
article 4.1) apply, meaning that Member States may
5 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law,
(2nd edn, Tottel, 2007), 4.5 also illustrates this
issue.
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establish the rules which apply to service providers
established on their territories, and that they may not
restrict the provision of services originating in another
Member State. However, with respect to the legal value
of trust services, the relevant provisions of the Directive
(article 5 of the Directive) are only meaningful when the
signatory aims to create a substitute for a hand written
signature. In all the other examples mentioned above, it
is impossible on the basis of the Directive to link any
legal value to a service, other than perhaps to state that
its electronic nature does not invalidate it outright. As
legal support to a trust service goes, this would appear
to be a relatively weak endorsement.
In conclusion, the implicit focus of the Directive is
quite clearly on enabling electronic tools that emulate
traditional hand written signatures to be recognized as
a form of e-signature. It aims to achieve this effect
through a number of simple and logical rules and
principles. These will be discussed in the following
section, as they may be relevant when resolving the
trust issues that the Digital Single Market currently
faces, as will be commented below, at least from the
legal perspective.
The main principles of the eSignature Directive 
The rules established by the Directive addresses the
legal, technical and trust landscape required to allow an
interoperable e-signatures market to function, with a
strong focus on digital signatures. The conceptual
framework (definitions of e-signature tiers and CSPs)
has already been briefly explained above, as has the
approach of the legal effect of e-signatures. However,
the other building blocks also deserve some
consideration, if only to help explain why the Directive
has not been able to achieve the desired purpose.
As a basic foundation of the Directive, the free market
principle (or more accurately: the internal market rules)
are a logical consequence of treating certification
services as a market service. To enable the internal
market, it is vitally important that Member States
cannot set arbitrary barriers to foreign CSPs. This goal
has been implemented via article 4 of the Directive,
declaring that “[e]ach Member State shall apply the
national provisions which it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to certification-service-providers established
on its territory and to the services which they provide.
Member States may not restrict the provision of
certification-services originating in another Member
State in the fields covered by this Directive.” CSPs are
thus largely governed by a country-of-origin rule, which
ensures that they do not need to comply with 27
materially different sets of rules if they choose to
operate in all 27 Member States.
As a technical tool, advanced e-signatures also
require a minimum common technical framework to
ensure their operation. This technical framework is not
included directly in the Directive as such. Indeed, that
would have been a poor strategic choice, given the
relative procedural complexity of renegotiating a
Directive, which would make it very difficult to keep the
technical framework updated. Instead, the Directive
contains only a fairly high level set of requirements in
its four annexes, relating to:
Annex I: requirements for qualified certificates
Annex II: requirements for certification-service-
providers issuing qualified certificates
Annex III: requirements for secure signature-
creation devices
Annex IV: recommendations for secure signature
verification
With respect to technical standardization, the Annexes
do not aim to provide guidance for specific
implementation or assessment activities, as they are far
too generic for that purpose. Instead, the Directive
foresees the possibility of providing additional guidance
through Commission Decisions, to be taken upon the
advice of an “Electronic-Signature Committee” created
under article 9 of the Directive, thus colloquially known
as the “Article 9 Committee”. This Committee may:
1. clarify the requirements laid down in the Annexes;
2.clarify the criteria that Member States should apply
when designating a body to determine the
conformity of secure signature-creation-devices
with the requirements of the Directive;
3.clarify “generally recognized standards for
electronic signature products”, notably by
establishing and publishing reference numbers of
such standards in the Official Journal of the
European Communities. When this has been done,
the internal market provisions of article 3.5 require
the Member States to presume that meeting those
standards also implies compliance with the
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requirements laid down in Annex II, point (f)
(relating to the requirement for CSPs issuing
qualified certificates to use trustworthy systems
and products which are protected against
modification and ensure the technical and
cryptographic security of the process supported by
them), and in Annex III (requirements for secure
signature-creation devices).
Through this process, two main Commission Decisions
were taken: Decision 2000/709/EC6 establishing the
minimum criteria for conformity assessment bodies, and
Decision 2003/511/EC7 publishing reference numbers to
three generally recognized standards8 for electronic
signature products which create a presumption of
compliance with part of the qualified electronic
signature requirements. Perhaps surprisingly, neither
one of these Decisions was ever updated, despite
developments in global e-signature standardization
initiatives.9
Finally, the Directive also incorporated a trust
infrastructure to support certification service providers.
Essentially, the trusted (or untrusted) state of an
electronic signature is a function of many factors, one of
which is the role of a trusted third party. In the absence
of a trusted third party (e.g. a simple e-signature
consisting of a text file appended to an e-mail, where
the text file and e-mail are both solely created by the
signatory), an e-signature has a limited ability to
provide confidence in the text that has been signed,
where the authenticity of the e-mail is uncertain. In
those cases, the signature amounts to little more than
the word of the signatory, which was already reflected in
the signed text without any signature. Through the
involvement of a trusted third party (such as the CSP
issuing signature certificates in a PKI-based advanced e-
signature system), relying parties have a more
substantial anchor to which they can attach confidence.
If they know that the issuer is trustworthy, then that
removes at least one possible area of doubt.
A significant issue is how a relying party can
determine whether such a trusted third party is in fact
to be trusted.10 The Directive provides a solution to this
question through the concepts of supervision,
conformity determinations and accreditation:
1. Member States must establish appropriate
supervision schemes, in which (at a minimum) CSPs
established within their borders that issue qualified
certificates to the public are supervised (article 3.3
of the Directive). Since qualified certificates are a
prerequisite to creating qualified signatures, this
implies that qualified signature solutions by
definition benefit from some degree of supervision,
thus improving their trustworthiness.
2.As noted above, the second component of a
qualified signature (apart from the qualified
certificate) is the use of a secure signature-creation-
device. The Directive specifies that Member States
can designate bodies with assessing the
compliance of such devices with the requirements
of the Directive (as laid down in Annex III). Such
findings of conformity are to be recognized in all
Member States (article 3.4).
3.Finally, Member States are also allowed to
introduce “voluntary accreditation schemes aiming
at enhanced levels of certification-service
provision” (article 3.2 of the Directive). Member
States can use such schemes to institute quality
labels, or to define ‘trust levels’ of signature types
in an effort to make the market more transparent
and intuitive to consumers and service providers. It
is important to recognize that “enhanced levels of
certification-service provision” does not necessarily
imply a high reliability of e-signature solutions;
even basic (non-advanced) e-signatures may be
subject to voluntary accreditation, irrespective of
their objective reliability. The Directive requires that
the conditions related to such schemes must be
“objective, transparent, proportionate and non-
discriminatory”, to avoid market distortions.
However, since accreditation schemes are by
definition established at the national level, they
tend to enable trust at the expense of
6 2000/709/EC: Commission Decision of 6
November 2000 on the minimum criteria to be
taken into account by Member States when
designating bodies in accordance with article 3(4)
of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on a Community
framework for electronic signatures (notified
under document number C(2000) 3179) (Text with
EEA relevance) OJ L 289, 16.11.2000, p. 42–43.
7 2003/511/EC: Commission Decision of 14 July 2003
on the publication of reference numbers of
generally recognised standards for electronic
signature products in accordance with Directive
1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under
document number C(2003) 2439) OJ L 175,
15.7.2003, p. 45–46.
8 Notably the following standards: CWA 14167-1
(March 2003): security requirements for
trustworthy systems managing certificates for
electronic signatures - Part 1: System Security
Requirements; CWA 14167-2 (March 2002):
security requirements for trustworthy systems
managing certificates for electronic signatures -
Part 2: cryptographic module for CSP signing
operations - Protection Profile (MCSO-PP); CWA
14169 (March 2002): secure signature-creation
devices.
9 For an 11-page exhaustive list of standards across
the globe, see Stephen Mason, Electronic
Signatures in Law, Appendix 3.
10 On this topic, note chapters 11, 12 and 13 in
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law.
RETHINKING THE E-SIGNATURES DIRECTIVE: ON LAWS, TRUST SERVICES, AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET
14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8 © Pario Communications Limited, 2011
Apart from technical complexity, the European advanced e-
signature market in 1999 was developing rapidly, with relatively
few services being made available as stand-alone products for the
public in most EU Member States
interoperability, since foreign service providers are
less likely to have a business case for seeking
voluntary accreditation in another Member State,
even if their signature solutions objectively meet or
exceed the requirements of the voluntary scheme.
On the basis of these trust enablers, each Member 
State must have a supervisory body to supervise CSPs
issuing qualified certificates to the public. In addition, 
it may also have an accreditation body to manage any
voluntary accreditation scheme, and it may have one or
more conformity assessment bodies to determine the
compliance of any supposed secure signature creation
devices. Conceptually, this approach is sound, as it
ensures that the legal and technical framework are
linked through a workable supervisory framework.
Thus, the Directive provided a basic legal framework
that established the main legal, technical and trust
building blocks. While clearly slanted towards state of
the art PKI solutions, this was considered to be
appropriate to sustain an interoperable e-signatures
market.
Effect on the e-signatures market
A cursory examination of current EU initiatives involving
or requiring the cross border use of e-signatures (e.g. in
relation to e-procurement, e-justice, e-invoicing, the
implementation of the Services Directive, or any
exchange of authentic e-documents) shows that the
eSignature Directive has largely failed to achieve this
objective. Even leading initiatives in this area are still
developing or piloting solutions, twelve years after the
adoption of the Directive. Solutions for cross border
interoperability either require closed contractual
frameworks – essentially cutting out the influence of the
Directive to a large extent – or abandon the high-
security, high-certainty goals of the Directive by
adopting simple (non-PKI) e-signature solutions or by
reducing the trust assurances to relying parties. In
effect, even if one accepts that the eSignature Directive
has helped create a market for advanced e-signature
services at the national level, any beneficial effect on
the internal market (i.e. at the cross border level) is
modest at best.
The present position
A number of factors can be identified that may be partly
responsible for the lack of an internal market for
advanced e-signatures, or more generally for the lack of
cross border interoperability. It is important to recognize
that not all of these factors are related to the EU
framework for advanced e-signatures as briefly
described above. For one, it is inherently difficult to
provide an appropriate legal framework in a
technological area which evolves very quickly, notably in
order to respond appropriately to security challenges.
This is especially true in relation to advanced electronic
signatures, where new standards are continuously
developed and algorithms are deprecated when
weaknesses become apparent.
Apart from technical complexity, the European
advanced e-signature market in 1999 was developing
rapidly, with relatively few services being made
available as stand-alone products for the public in most
EU Member States. Finally, as was already noted in the
introduction to this article, the business case for the
advanced e-signatures as a separate service (i.e. in
isolation from applications in which they are intended to
be used, such as e-banking) remains uncertain. All of
these elements made it inherently complex to create a
legal framework that would enable a flourishing internal
market for advanced e-signature services.
Nevertheless, the current EU framework is clearly also
not without its flaws, and a number of issues can be
clearly linked to the lack of an internal market. An
exhaustive study of these issues and their effect was
conducted on behalf of the European Commission in
2010 under the acronym CROBIES (Study on Cross-
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Border Interoperability of e-signatures), which is
available for online consultation.11 Briefly summarized,
the CROBIES study identified, amongst other things, the
following weaknesses and criticisms:
1. The legal framework is unclear and ambiguous on
certain important points. For instance, opinion is
split in the Member States on the question of
whether the concept of a ‘signatory’ can include
legal entities, i.e. whether an e-signature can be
ascribed directly to a company rather than to the
person signing on behalf of that company. Similarly,
it is still debated whether a secure-signature-
creation device (SSCD) must undergo an affirmative
conformity assessment by a designated body, or
whether such an assessment is merely advisable to
remove or reduce doubts on its status.
2.The technical framework is outdated and does not
link cleanly to legal requirements. The Commission
Decision above only references three specific
standards which are partially outdated and do not
unambiguously apply to some advanced e-
signature creation approaches. For instance, the
use of mobile telephones or HSMs (Hardware
security modules) is increasingly popular in the
advanced e-signature market, yet these are not
clearly addressed by the referenced standards.12
Furthermore, the EU standardization landscape is
highly complex: beyond the aforementioned three
standards, there are around 30 other
standardization projects whose link to specific legal
requirements is not clear. The fact that Commission
Decisions under the Directive can only create a
presumption of compliance with the requirements
of Annex II(f ) and Annex III of the Directive, and not
with other requirements, makes it even harder to
assess any formal value to these standardization
documents.
3.The trust framework is too vague to create
justifiable trust in the internal market. As described
above, CSPs issuing qualified certificates to the
public are subject to national supervision schemes.
However, the Directive merely requires that these
supervision schemes are ‘appropriate’, without
providing guidance to the Member States as to
what this entails. As shown in the CROBIES study,
national requirements range from a simple
notification letter to the supervision body to full and
periodically recurring audits, creating an uneven
trust landscape, not to mention internal market
distortions. Apart from this inequality, there was no
homogeneous way for relying parties to determine
whether a CSP was indeed supervised in practice,
since supervision bodies did not have a common
communication strategy on this issue. This problem
was only addressed in October 2009 – ten years
after the adoption of the Directive – when a
Commission Decision13 issued against the backdrop
of the Services Directive required supervising
bodies to use a common trusted list approach to
publicly announce the supervision status of their
CSPs. Prior to that time, relying parties would need
to check the supervision status of a CSP manually
each time they wanted to rely on a signature.
Similarly, when SSCDs have undergone conformity
assessments (the need of which is already unclear,
as noted above), there is no common approach to
publish this status, and no way to keep this status
updated over time as potential weaknesses
threatening the SSCD status are uncovered.
Clearly, the legal, technical and trust frameworks
established by the eSignature Directive have their flaws.
It should be noted however that these flaws primarily
apply to qualified signature solutions, since questions
related to supervision and SSCDs are much less
relevant to other signature types. None the less, since
the eSignature Directive only created a clear and
predictable legal effect for these types of signatures,
this can be considered a real weakness.
While important, these problems could be fixed
through limited changes and updates of the legal,
technical and trust framework. There is, however, a
broader weakness in the Directive, which would require
11  Study on Cross-Border Interoperability of e-
signatures (CROBIES), A report to the European
Commission from SEALED, time.lex and Siemens
(Version 1.0, 2010); the author helped to write
this report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/policy/esignature/crobies_s
tudy/index_en.htm.
12 For instance, see Frederic Stumpf, Markus
Sacher, Claudia Eckert and Alexander Roßnagel,
‘The creation of Qualified Signatures with
Trusted Platform Modules’, Digital Evidence
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007)
61 – 6.
13 Commission Decision 2009/767/EC of 16
October 2009 setting out measures facilitating
the use of procedures by electronic means
through the ‘points of single contact’ under
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on services in the
internal market, OJ L 274, 20.10.2009 p. 36
(Corrigendum to Commission Decision
2009/767/EC of 16 October 2009 setting out
measures facilitating the use of procedures by
electronic means through the points of single
contact under Directive 2006/123/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on
services in the internal market (OJ L 274,
20.10.2009 ) OJ L 299, 14/11/2009 P. 0018 –
0054); as amended by the Commission Decision
of 28 July 2010 amending Decision 2009/767/EC
as regards the establishment, maintenance and
publication of trusted lists of certification
service providers supervised/accredited by
Member States, OJ L 199, 31.7.2010, p. 30.
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substantially greater changes. As noted above under
the description of the scope of the Directive, its
provisions clearly focus principally on electronic
signatures as a substitute for hand written signatures.
This emphasis disregards the reality that finding a
substitute for hand written signatures is only one
possible application of certification services. There are
many other varieties of such services, as shown in the
graphic below:
As it stands, the EU legal framework mainly covers 
e-signatures to the exclusion of any other service using,
or ancillary to, electronic signatures, such as time-
stamping services, long term archiving services,
electronic registered mail, or signature validation
services. More importantly, there are clear
dependencies between these services that affect their
viability in the market.
As an example, an e-signature as a substitute for a
hand written signature is only meaningful if it can be
adequately linked to a signatory, either as an
identifiable individual, or at least by a pseudonym.
Indeed, the eSignature Directive recognizes this issue,
as it defines certificates as electronic attestations
“which link signature-verification data to a person and
confirm the identity of that person” (article 2.9).
Similarly, advanced14 signatures under the Directive
must (amongst others) be “uniquely linked to the
signatory” 15 and “ capable of identifying the signatory”
(article 2.2). Thus, when e-signatures are intended to
emulate hand written signatures, identification is a
prerequisite. Yet the Directive does not address how this
should be done, other than to note that the use of
pseudonyms in certificates “should not prevent Member
States from requiring identification of persons pursuant
to Community or national law” (recital 25). This
requirement is echoed in Annex II (d) in relation to
qualified signature certificates, noting that CSPs must
“verify, by appropriate means in accordance with
national law, the identity and, if applicable, any specific
attributes of the person to which a qualified certificate
is issued.” Identification (either as an independent
process preceding the issuing of signature certificates
or as a separate type of authentication service) is not
harmonized by the Directive in any meaningful way.
The same observation applies to time stamping,
another type of certification service that supports the
determination of the authenticity of e-signatures. The
value to be given to an e-signature is partly predicated
on the mechanism used to reliably determine when it
was created. This is a crucial question, since relying
parties mainly need to be able to assess whether an e-
signature was valid at the time it was created, not
merely at the present time (which may be years later).
The time factor is an important pillar to the
trustworthiness of e-signatures and a valuable
certification service in its own right. Again, the Directive
does not cover this aspect in a meaningful way.
Other ancillary services mentioned in the overview
above build on these tools: electronic archiving
depends on time stamping,16 and electronic registered
mail requires both reliable identification of the
signatories (senders and recipients alike) and time
stamping. In the absence of the basic tools, the
derivative services cannot be created either.
In short, it is important to recognize that e-signatures
are a component of an ecosystem of certification
services. When the Directive covers only one element of
that ecosystem (and imperfectly at that, as argued
above), new market distortions will inevitably arise.
Some Member States have already made the decision of
creating their own national legal frameworks for some
of these certification services, including time stamping,
electronic registered mail and archiving. In the absence
of harmonizing provisions at the European level, this is
creating new internal market barriers: a “qualified time
stamping service” in Member State A may have no legal
value in Member State B, either because Member State
B has no legal framework for this type of service, or
14 Interestingly, no such requirement applies to the
base notion of “electronic signatures”, for which
the Directive requires that they ‘serve as a
method of authentication’ in general. This is in
line with the observation made above, namely
that electronic signatures in general could be
interpreted to cover any application of
authentication services, but that the Directive
only provides a meaningful legal framework for
e-signatures as a substitute for hand written
signatures.
15 For a critical analysis of this concept, see
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law,
4.9.
16 Stefanie Fischer-Dieskau and Daniel Wilke,
‘Electronically signed documents: legal
requirements and measures for their long-term
conservation’ Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 40 – 44
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because the legal framework is different. In practical
terms, the time stamping service provider has no way of
learning about possible issues other than to seek legal
advice on a country by country basis, in order to
discover whether its service has any value outside of its
national borders, and what changes might be necessary
to satisfy national legal requirements. This would
appear to be a textbook example of the type of barrier
that the European internal market should aim to avoid.
Based on these observations, it would appear that the
eSignature Directive is in serious need of review, at a
minimum to fix the smaller issues mentioned above.
However, this may also be a good opportunity to
broaden the legal framework to ensure that certification
services are more comprehensively covered and to
avoid further barriers in the internal market. Obviously,
the lessons learned from the eSignature Directive
should be considered if this broader approach is taken.
Trust in the digital single market: what
rules, if any, are required?
The EU Digital Agenda and its perspective on IAS 
The Digital Agenda was published as a Communication
of the European Commission in 2010,17 and contains the
common European strategy for creating “a flourishing
digital economy by 2020”. It outlines a number of
policies and actions that support this objective, grouped
around various action areas. For the purposes of this
article – examining the challenges and options for the
eSignature Directive – the most relevant action area
relates to improving trust and security.
The Digital Agenda positions e-signatures in the
broader context of trust and security challenges in the
information society, which include such topics as
misappropriation of identity, fraud, cyber crime, data
protection, privacy-by-design, and critical information
infrastructure protection. E-signatures (and electronic
identities) can be considered as mechanisms that can
contribute to building viable solutions on each of these
points.
The Agenda correctly stresses the necessity of
ensuring the trustworthiness of technology as a
prerequisite to its use in practice. It has been observed
above that this was one of the main issues of the
current EU framework for advanced e-signatures:
objectively, there are no sufficient assurances with
respect to advanced e-signatures from other Member
States. Complexity and user friendliness are equally
important: end users will never accept foreign advanced
e-signatures if they first have to learn what an SSCD is
or if they have to check the supervisory status of a
certificate. End users should not be confronted with
these questions in their normal use of electronic
signatures. However, the eSignature Directive currently
does not provide appropriate tools to develop secure,
reliable and easy to use signature creation and
validation solutions that can enable end users to rely on
advanced e-signatures without worrying about the
technological, legal and operational minutiae. The
development of such solutions would first require
existing ambiguities in the Directive and the
surrounding framework to be coherently addressed.
Recognizing that the Directive has been unable to
meet its stated purpose of “facilitat[ing] the use of
electronic signatures and contribut[ing] to their legal
recognition” (article 1 of the Directive), the Digital
Agenda proposes a revision of the e-signatures
Directive, “with a view to provide a legal framework for
cross-border recognition and interoperability of secure
eAuthentication systems.”
It is worth noting the interesting phrasing of the
proposed action set out in the Agenda: the revision
should result in a legal framework for ‘secure
eAuthentication systems’. The Commission might have
also simply called for a revision focusing on ‘secure
electronic signatures’, and this would appear to have
been the more intuitive choice if there had been no
intention of contemplating the scope of the e-signatures
Directive. The choice of phrasing, focusing on
‘eAuthentication systems’ in general, suggests that the
Commission might be open to explore further options.
The specific challenges relating to electronic
identification undoubtedly play a role in this particular
phrasing. Indeed, the Agenda contains a further related
action, namely to propose by 2012 a Council and
Parliament Decision “to ensure mutual recognition of e-
identification and e-authentication across the EU based
on online ‘authentication services’ to be offered in all
Member States (which may use the most appropriate
official citizen documents – issued by the public or the
private sector)”. This action could be used to address
one of the current challenges in relation to electronic
identification: while innovative EU projects (such as the
large scale pilot STORK18 ) have developed functioning
technical solutions to eID challenges, there is currently
17 Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for
Europe – 26.8.2010; COM(2010) 245 final/2.
18 https://www.eid-stork.eu/.
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no broader legal or policy framework to move these
pilots into operational solutions for the general public. 
A Commission Decision could clarify this point, by
ensuring at a minimum that Member States have a list
of electronic identification methods from other Member
States that they agree to treat as equivalent.
Thus, the Agenda seems to have a strategy to improve
the trustworthiness of eAuthentication systems, albeit
without specifying at this stage exactly what those
systems might entail, beyond the obvious candidates of
e-signatures and electronic identities.
The needs of the Digital Single Market
While the summary above focuses on the trust and
security aspects of the Digital Agenda, it should be
recognized that the Agenda takes a much broader
perspective, and correctly notes that the EU has in many
respects failed to bring about a true Digital Single
Market, in which on-line service borders are eliminated
(or at least reduced) in the same way as for the offline
single market. 
Specifically, the Agenda notes that:
“[t]he internet is borderless, but online markets,
both globally and in the EU, are still separated by
multiple barriers affecting not only access to pan-
European telecom services but also to what should
be global internet services and content. This is
untenable. First, the creation of attractive online
content and services and its free circulation inside
the EU and across its borders are fundamental to
stimulate the virtuous cycle of demand. However,
persistent fragmentation is stifling Europe's
competitiveness in the digital economy. It is
therefore not surprising that the EU is falling behind
in markets such as media services, both in terms of
what consumers can access, and in terms of
business models that can create jobs in Europe.
Most of the recent successful internet businesses
(such as Google, eBay, Amazon and Facebook)
originate outside of Europe[3]. Second, despite the
body of key single market legislation on
eCommerce, eInvoicing and e-signatures,
transactions in the digital environment are still too
complex, with inconsistent implementation of the
rules across Member States. Third, consumers and
businesses are still faced with considerable
uncertainty about their rights and legal protection
when doing business on line. Fourth, Europe is far
from having a single market for telecom services.
The single market therefore needs a fundamental
update to bring it into the internet era.”
These observations seem entirely correct, and can also
be applied to eAuthentication services in general. The
recent Public consultation on electronic identification,
authentication and signatures19 have provided some
support of the Digital Agenda’s statements from the
perspective of others with an interest or concern in the
matter, asking among other points which trust building
services and credentials should be considered for
regulation at the European level in order to ensure their
cross-border use. The 418 respondents to the question
provided the following replies:
For which of the following trust building services and credentials
should legal or regulatory measures be considered at EU-level in order
to ensure their cross-border use?
Number % of total 
of replies number of 
replies to this 
question
Certified electronic documents in general 270 64,59%
Electronic seals 216 51,67%
Time stamping 219 52,39%
Certified delivery of mail 195 46,65%
Authorisations/mandates 194 46,41%
Long term archiving 191 45,69%
Electronic transferable records 136 32,54%
Official delivery address 119 28,47%
Others (please list) 68 16,27%
Pseudonyms 67 16,03%
Anonymous agents 47 11,24%
None 26 6,22%
Thus, only 6,22% felt that no further trust services
required any regulation. Respondents who chose this
answer and provided additional comments frequently
stated that regulations were unnecessary or too rigid,
and that standardization, accreditation schemes and
private sector initiatives would be adequate to address
cross border challenges.
Among those who felt that new regulations could be
valuable, certified electronic documents in general –
without further definition in the consultation – were the
main service type chosen for further regulation (64,59%
of respondents), with electronic seals and time
stamping each also being mentioned by more than half
19 For an overview of the consultation’s questions,
approach, and the contributions received, see
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/e
signature/eu_legislation/revision/pub_cons/ind
ex_en.htm.
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of respondents. As to whether electronic identification
should be regulated at the European level, this was
asked as a separate question. A majority of respondents
(65,07%) indicated that they would favour a European
legal framework of some sort for electronic
identification.
The issues related to advanced e-signatures have
already been discussed at length above, but similar
considerations apply to other digital services. Consider
a simple and realistic scenario: an international
undertaking wants to digitize its paper document
archives throughout the EU, including invoices and a
variety of contracts. New contracts will be created and
signed electronically wherever possible, but – as a
matter of commercial realism – the company knows that
many contracts will still initially be signed on paper,
before being converted. The issue is whether this
possible in the EU.
Technically, the answer is yes. All the required
technologies have existed for decades. Legally, the
answer is no. The company would need to assess which
documents can be digitized, and under what conditions.
The answer to that question depends from Member
State to Member State, and will include questions on
the types of contracts, paper formalities without
electronic equivalents (e.g. seals), specific national
legislation, archiving requirements, use and type of
signatures, time stamping, notarization, etc. Any
company brave enough to conduct an assessment on
this point will probably get only two clear results: a very
large legal report from at least 27 lawyers across 27
Member States filled to the brim with gray areas and
caveats, and no reliable way to move forward with a
single harmonized approach.
This is just the customer perspective. Consider the
situation from the service provider’s point of view.
Assume that a CSP wants to provide archiving services,
including assurances of long term legibility, integrity,
and time stamping. The first question any customer will
ask, is whether the service can be relied on, and what
assurances the service provider offers. In the absence of
a harmonized legal framework, the provider can only
reply that its service is technically and operationally
state of the art, and that it is (presumably) legal under
its own national laws. Whether the archived content
actually has any value in other Member States if legal
action arises in 15 years will depend on the national law
that will be applied to the legal action.
In the year 2011, this state of affairs is nothing short
of a tragedy to the economic development of European
businesses. Barriers that stifle the legal usability of
services across the European Union – both from the
perspective of service providers and from the
perspective of service users, as noted above – harm
European economic growth and stunt the adoption of
more efficient technologies. The potential for cost
savings in the EU for innovative e-authentication
systems – which includes the scenario above – must be
substantial. At a time where everyone is looking for
both cost cutting and innovation – typically in that order
– this is an opportunity that the EU should not miss. A
mere framework for e-signatures – even if the
challenges mentioned above are resolved – with a
smaller scale solution for eID recognition will not
provide an answer for the scenarios above.
Options for the future
A future legal framework for IAS services in
Europe: a not-so-modest proposal
The Digital Agenda has unambiguously announced a
revision of the eSignature Directive, which will probably
strive to fix at a minimum the shortcomings summarized
elsewhere in this article, together with a possible
Decision to ensure mutual recognition of certain eIDs
between Member States. This would undoubtedly be a
good step forward for the EU. None the less, a more
ambitious vision is discussed below, a vision that would
– hopefully – be capable of addressing the scenarios
mentioned above.
This vision builds on a simple but powerful
observation: e-authentication systems (to use the
terminology of the Digital Agenda) are similar in most
respects, but differ in small important details. This can
already be witnessed in the terminology as discussed
above: the definition of an electronic signature as
presented by the Directive (“data in electronic form
which are attached to or logically associated with other
electronic data and which serve as a method of
authentication”) is broad enough to potentially cover e-
signatures (in the equivalent-to-hand-written sense),
eID and time stamping, among many others. It is worth
considering whether a similar policy framework is also
possible, and even desirable, for these related services.
As a starting point, it is possible to consider prior
experiences across the Member States. The need for a
legal framework for ancillary services (time stamping,
company seals, electronic registered e-mail, long term
archiving) has been known for some time, and some
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Member States have been active in this field. To name
but a few examples:
1. Austria, as one of the leading EU Member States
in this area, has implemented legislation
regulating not only e-signatures, but also
electronic identification, through the 2004
eGovernment Act.20
2. Belgium adopted a generic legal framework for
certain trusted services in 2007,21 including
electronic registered mail, time stamping and
electronic archiving. Despite a recent update for
the rules on electronic registered mail in 2010
(integrated into the general e-signatures Act),
executive rules were never fixed, and the law
remains largely inoperative at present. However,
new legislation in this area is planned for the near
future.
3. The Czech Republic has implemented rules for
time stamping in its e-signatures Act of 2000.22
Interestingly, the law uses the same logic and
terminology (‘qualified time stamp’) that is also in
vogue for e-signatures.
4. Estonia, as another technology leader in the EU,
has a legal framework23 that supports (and indeed
requires) time stamping, digital stamps
(advanced e-signatures created by legal entities),
and official e-mails.
5. Similarly, Finland has adopted an Act on strong
electronic identification and electronic
signatures.24
6. Germany likewise introduced the notion of
qualified time stamping in its e-signatures Act.25
7. Italian law contains rules on electronic registered
mail.26
8. The Slovakian e-signatures Act contains specific
rules for time stamping.27
9. The Slovenian e-signatures Act recognizes the
concept of a time stamp as being comparable to
advanced e-signatures, with the same rules
applying by changing those things which need to
be changed;28
10. Finally, the Spanish Act on Electronic Citizen
Access to Public Services29 recognizes e-
signatures, e-seals (company signatures), and
time stamping.
This listing is neither fully up to date nor exhaustive. Its
purpose is merely to illustrate that a significant and
increasing number of Member States have recognized
the important role of e-authentication systems other
than mere e-signatures, and that they have provided a
legal framework for such services. When doing so, these
laws are often integrated or at least closely aligned with
general e-signature rules.
This is important for two reasons. First, it suggests
that the principles and challenges for various e-
authentication systems are similar, and that it might be
possible to address them in unison. Second, it also
shows a potential internal market barrier. If time
stamping service provider A can guarantee the legal
value of its services in one country (for instance,
because it is considered a qualified time stamping
service in that country) but not in another country (for
instance, because that country has no rules, or worse
yet, different ones), then that creates a market barrier.
This is a challenge for the EU to address, as it was an
almost identical observation that led to the adoption of
the e-signatures Directive.30
The sections below will examine what such a policy
framework for e-authentication services might look like,
and how it could be structured. As with e-signatures,
this policy framework should consist of a legal
framework, a technical framework, and a trust
20 E-Government-Gesetz.
21 Wet van 15 mei 2007 tot vaststelling van een
juridisch kader voor sommige verleners van
vertrouwensdiensten/ Loi du 15 mai 2007 fixant
un cadre juridique pour certains prestataires de
services de confiance.
22 Zákon č. 227/2000 Sb., o elektronickém podpisu
a o změně některých dalších zákonů (zákon o
elektronickém podpisu).
23 Digitaalallkirja seadus, RT I 2000, 26, 150.
24 Laki vahvasta sähköisestä tunnistamisesta ja
sähköisistä allekirjoituksista, 7.8.2009/617.
25 Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für
elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz -
SigG) vom 16.5.2001 (BGBl. I S. 876).
26 Through the Codice dell’Amministrazione
Digitale (the current version is Decreto
Legislativo 30 dicembre 2010, n. 235); Roberta
Falciai and Laura Liberati, ‘The Italian certified
e-mail system’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 50 – 54.
27 Zákon č.215/2002 Z.z. o elektronickom podpise
a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov –The
Slovakian Act (‘as amended’ or ‘v znení
neskorších predpisov’) was consolidated in
2009 (§9 of this Act still explicitly refers to time
stamping (Časová pečiatka – time stamping)),
see http://www.zbierka.sk/zz/predpisy/
default.aspx?PredpisID=208862&FileName=zz2
009-00076-0208862&Rocnik=2009.
28 Zakon o elektronskem poslovanju in
elektronskem podpisu.
29 Ley 11/2007, de 22 de junio, de acceso
electrónico de los ciudadanos a los Servicios
Públicos.
30 For example, see the table of diverging national
legislations on p. 4-5 of the 1998 Proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive on a
common framework for electronic signatures, at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/e
signature/docs/com1998_0297en.pdf. The table
is strikingly similar to the list above.
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framework, all of which must be clearly aligned and
attuned to business reality. The emphasis in the
sections below will be on the possible regulatory
framework – provisionally designated as an e-
authentication Directive – but observations on the
technical and trust aspects will be added to clarify how
this could work in practice.
Basic principles of e-authentication services 
The fundamental concept behind a more comprehensive
framework for e-authentication services is the
observation that all service providers in this area share
certain similarities, and the policy framework should
reflect this. Broadly, an e-authentication Directive could
be structured as follows:
Logically, the common section would specify the
common characteristics of all e-authentication services.
Subsequent sections would thereafter focus on specific
services and their unique characteristics. As with the
current eSignature Directive, it is possible to envisage
technical elements that require greater flexibility and
more frequent updates to be adopted separately via
Commission Decisions.
Consistency and comprehensiveness
An important question is how e-authentication services
will be defined, and which types of service providers
should be covered by such a Directive. The common
element of e-authentication services can be derived
from the current definition of e-signatures (which, as
noted above, is not inherently linked to the emulation of
hand written signatures): an e-authentication service is
any type of information society service31 which serves as
a method of authentication of electronic data. This
definition is technologically neutral, and is sufficiently
broad to cover most of the services mentioned above.
Based on this generic definition, the Directive can
define subtypes of e-authentication services, using
similar technologically neutral language. As a basic
requirement, electronic signatures (both for natural
persons and legal entities), electronic identification and
time stamping would be obvious candidates for
inclusion. These are the fundamental building blocks to
make other e-authentication services work, and are thus
crucial to an e-authentication framework.
To provide for the full potential of e-authentication
services, it would be appealing to include other services
in a common Directive, including electronic archiving,
digitization, validation services, and electronic
registered mail. It should be acknowledged, however,
that the addition of new services may also create
unforeseen complexities. To mention two examples: the
digitization of paper documents cannot unequivocally
be considered to be an information society service,
since it is not necessarily provided at a distance; and
the introduction of rules for electronic registered mail as
an internal market service may well have interesting
overlaps with existing EU regulations for postal
services.
Apart from the different definitions, most of the
Common Section of the Directive would borrow heavily
from the existing eSignature Directive, as the principles
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31 Building on the definition provided by the
eCommerce Directive 2000/31/EC, which in turn
was based on the definitions of Directive
98/34/EC, as amended.
As with the current eSignature Directive, it is possible to
envisage technical elements that require greater
flexibility and more frequent updates to be adopted
separately via Commission Decisions
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of this Directive – if not necessarily the details behind
their implementation – are fundamentally sound. Basic
principles of the common section would include:
1. Internal market rules, based on articles 3 and 4 of
the eSignature Directive. The basic rule for all e-
authentication services would be free market
access, without prior authorization schemes, and
applicability of the rules of the service provider’s
country of establishment.
2.The introduction of two basic tiers of services:
general e-authentication services (as determined by
the definitions) and qualified e-authentication
services. As is currently the case for e-signatures,
general services need not meet any additional
requirements (other than respecting applicable
laws, such as the national transpositions of the
Data Protection Directive), and benefit from a non-
discrimination principle (i.e. they may not be denied
legal value on the grounds that they are electronic
services or on the grounds that they are not
qualified, comparable to the phrasing of article 5.2
of the eSignature Directive). In contrast, qualified
services would:
a. Be granted a clear legal effect, to be
established in the relevant specific section.
b. Need to satisfy basic quality requirements.
Common quality requirements for all qualified
e-authentication services would include
independence, liability (comparable to article 6
of the e-signatures Directive), availability of
suitably qualified staff, insurance coverage to
satisfy its potential liabilities, etc. The common
section should only specify requirements that
apply to all qualified e-authentication services;
requirements that apply only to specific e-
authentication service types can be specified in
the relevant specific section.
3.The introduction of a mechanism for recognizing
equivalent non-European e-authentication service
providers, similar to the principles in article 7 of the
eSignatures Directive.
4.Rules in relation to supervision, voluntary
accreditation, and conformity assessments. These
will require some changes compared to the present
eSignature Directive:
a. Supervision should remain mandatory for
qualified e-authentication service providers,
and should still be undertaken by national
supervisory bodies. However, minimum
requirements for appropriate supervision
should be set through a Commission Decision,
and national supervisory bodies should publish
the supervised status of service providers
through trusted lists. This would address the
weaknesses of the eSignature Directive as
described in the introductory section.
b. Voluntary accreditation may still be undertaken
at the national level by any body designated to
operate such a national voluntary accreditation
scheme in the Member State. However, as an
important terminological point, it may be useful
to no longer describe such accreditation as
‘permissions’ (the way the current Directive
does in article 2.13), since this often makes it
virtually impossible to distinguish legitimate
voluntary accreditation from forbidden prior
authorization. Rather, it may be advisable to
simply refer to them as what they should be:
quality assurance schemes.
c. As a new element, the e-authentication
Directive should also permit the establishment
of European voluntary accreditation schemes
through Commission Decisions. This is a simple
but very potent addition to address a crucial
problem with accreditation schemes: currently,
they may be beneficial at the national level, but
they cause disruptions in the internal market.
The introduction of common EU level
accreditation schemes could address this: an
EU accreditation scheme could determine
quality requirements that Member States agree
on to enable interoperability in cases where a
service does not meet the qualified level, but is
still ‘good enough’ for a specific horizontal or
vertical application domain. By way of
examples, one might consider:
i. An EU accreditation scheme formalizing the
STORK Quality Authentication Assurance
framework, thus allowing any e-ID means to
be assessed and accredited against this
framework.
ii. An EU accreditation scheme for e-
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procurement, identifying the types of e-
signatures accepted for public procurement
portals.
iii. An EU accreditation scheme for legal
services, identifying the basic requirements
for e-ID providers in the legal services
sectors (e.g. bar associations, Ministries of
Justice, professional bodies of public
notaries).
iv. An EU accreditation scheme linking
international schemes to their European
equivalents, which could facilitate the
establishment of international
interoperability of e-authentication services,
with the benefit of a clear legal basis.
It would go beyond the purposes of this
contribution to assess for each of these
examples whether they make business and
policy sense or whether they are conceptually
sound; but based on discussions in relation to
e-ID and e-signatures – including the
contemplated Commission Decision relating to
the mutual recognition of e-IDs – it would
appear that there is a clear need for such
instruments. Rather than a one-off Decision for
e-IDs, it might be beneficial to establish a re-
usable approach to establish such EU wide
schemes when there is a need and benefit for
European administrations, businesses and
citizens.
d. Conformity assessments in relation to e-
authentication devices (such as SSCDs in the
case of qualified e-signatures) will require a
clarification whether such assessments are
mandatory or optional, and who should provide
them. At any rate, when a conformity
assessment is granted, there will be a need to
publish the assessment status in a
homogeneous way, to ensure that they are
actually useful at the European level. Again, the
use of trusted lists (as is currently already done
for CSPs issuing qualified signature certificates
to the public) would be a good instrument for
this.
5.Finally, a mechanism will need to be defined for the
establishment (or more accurately, the referencing)
of standards at the European level. This can be
based on the current approach, with a Committee
evaluating the need for such standards and
formalizations through Commission Decisions.
However, the requirement of occasional updates
will require some further attention, either by
making the Committee permanent, or by clarifying
the legal value of updates of referenced standards.
Addressing specific e-authentication services 
Separately from the Common Section, the details in
relation to individual e-authentication services – mainly
their specific requirements and legal effect at the
qualified level – should be regulated in separate
sections. As an alternative, consideration might be given
to implementing the e-authentication Directive as a pure
framework directive, consisting only of the common
section as presented above, and to which specific e-
authentication services can be added through separate
regulations whenever they are justified. This would
certainly offer the benefit of flexibility. However, the
need for urgent progress for e-authentication services –
in keeping with the timing of the Digital Agenda – would
seem to amply justify the creation of a more
comprehensive instrument.
The main challenge in this respect is obviously the
definition of clear legal effects for qualified services.
While the legal effect of qualified e-signatures
(equivalent to hand written signatures) now seems
obvious, it would also be necessary to define the legal
value of qualified identities or qualified time stamps.
However, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. The
most difficult type of qualified authentication service is
probably the qualified electronic identity, which lacks a
clear physical analogy. Since an electronic identity is
fundamentally a collection of electronic attributes
pertaining to a specific entity, the legal effect of a
qualified electronic identity could however be
addressed by regulating the reliability of these
attributes and the liability model behind their
correctness, in much the same way as the eSignatures
Directive already does. With respect to qualified
certificates – a prerequisite for the creation of qualified
electronic signatures – article 6.1 states that
certification service providers issuing qualified
certificates to the public are as a minimum liable
“for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural
person who reasonably relies on that certificate:
(a) as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance
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of all information contained in the qualified
certificate and as regards the fact that the
certificate contains all the details prescribed for a
qualified certificate;
(b) for assurance that at the time of the issuance of
the certificate, the signatory identified in the
qualified certificate held the signature-creation
data corresponding to the signature-verification
data given or identified in the certificate;
(c) for assurance that the signature-creation data
and the signature-verification data can be used in
a complementary manner in cases where the
certification-service-provider generates them
both;
unless the certification-service-provider proves that
he has not acted negligently.”
Similarly, such a certification service provider is also
liable for damages resulting from a failure to register
revocation of the certificate (article 6.2). Limitations on
this liability may be indicated in the certificate itself
(articles 6.3 and 6.4). 
This liability model certainly has its flaws, notably the
lack of any explicit obligation to act on indications that
the information in the certificate is no longer correct,
and the rather broad flexibility of the liability mitigation
options. None the less, this approach of providing
assurances of identity through liability may be as viable
for qualified identities as they are for qualified
signatures. While qualified identities would not benefit
from an intuitive equivalence rule, they would at least
provide the assurance of monetary compensation.
Of course, stronger approaches could also be
considered, but are likely to be much less palatable
from a political or practical perspective. A significantly
more far reaching approach to regulating the legal value
of qualified identities would be to require Member
States to ensure that the constituent attributes are
admissible as evidence in legal proceedings and benefit
from a refutable legal presumption of correctness.
However, this approach is unlikely to hold much appeal
for certain Member States with a strong tradition of
official identity documents, who might perceive this
model as encroaching upon their monopoly of issuing
strong credentials. It may also not appeal due to the
reversal of the burden of proof, as it would then be for
relying parties to show that the end user’s identity
claims would not be correct, which might be a costly
and complicated process. For these reasons, a lighter
liability based approach might be preferable.
Concluding notes
The observations above on the weaknesses of the e-
signatures rules are not new, and it is clear that these
ambitious suggestions for an e-authentication
framework are incomplete and imperfect. The goal of
this contribution was however, not to draft a near-final
Directive, or to convince the reader that all the answers
are readily available.
Rather, this paper aims to make and justify a few
observations:
1. The current European framework for e-signatures is
built on healthy principles, but flawed in many
important respects. These issues need to be fixed.
2. E-signatures are not the only type of authentication
service. Authenticity is a basic building block for
trust and security in the information society. By
focusing exclusively on e-signatures, the European
policy framework will remain incomplete.
3. There is a business opportunity in establishing a
coherent and comprehensive framework for
authenticity services. So far, the European Union
has failed to do this. Is it possible for a person to
create, sign and store any type of contract
electronically, anywhere in the EU, and be sure that
it will still be enforceable in 15 years? This is a
simple question, and there is no clear affirmative
answer. That is not acceptable in the year 2011.
Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to add to the
discussion on policy, and provide at least one avenue
for progress. It is certainly not the only available
solution, and may not be the best one. But one thing is
clear: the EU needs to be more ambitious. And it cannot
afford to wait.
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